Gary Mosher v. Director, Division of Taxation ARGUMENT Claims of: Disqualifying Judicial Misconduct Illegal Summary Disposal: The "summary" termination of evidence collection and argument in the lower court was imposed in violation of statutory requirements and has wrongfully denied plaintiff the opportunity to create a deservingly complete record from which to argue in this subsequent appeals process. Due and fair process has been denied. It is plaintiff's argument that the defendant, being the moving party, was required to produce "a statement of material facts." From R 4:46-2 ... The statement of material facts shall set forth in separately numbered paragraphs a concise statement of each material fact as to which the movant contends there is no genuine issue together with a citation to the portion of the motion record establishing the fact or demonstrating that is uncontroverted. The citation shall identify the document and shall specify the pages and paragraphs or lines thereof or the specific portions of exhibits relied on. A motion for summary judgment may be denied without prejudice for failure to file the required statement of material facts. ... What was produced was neither complete, accurate, nor adequate cause to sustain a motion for summary termination. In his original claim against the Division of Taxation (Facts and Contentions [B]) plaintiff makes undetailed, yet obvious, reference to various constitutional violations disqualifying the assessment of tax liability. In defendant's answer of May 13, 2002 [C] defendant "denies upon information and belief each and every allegation contained in plaintiff's seventh (taxation without representation) Fact and Contention". This denial (material disagreement) is not referenced or supported by evidence or argument by defendant or the judge in any documentation filed or oral statement made. I would argue that both had a statutory obligation to either convincingly defend their position in opposition to the claimed fact or to decisively demonstrate immateriality regardless of all that such a fact as truth could possibly infer. Neither did either. The rest of plaintiff's contentions of constitutional violation were "answered" by defendant with one of the following statements [C]: a. ... to the extent that plaintiff is asserting allegations of fact, same are denied. ... or b. ... defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in plaintiff's Fact and Contention and leaves plaintiff to his proofs. ... In all cases, no substantive argument has been provided mitigating these effective material disagreements and certainly no claim made by the plaintiff has been demonstrated to be unreasonable to the required standard. I would further argue that there is an ugly duplicity in defendant stating that it "leaves plaintiff to his proofs" and in its next official act attempting to foreclose (through motion for summary disposal [I]) plaintiff's opportunity to provide those proofs. The defendant states in its May 13, 2002 answer [C] that: ... the defendant's assessments are lawful, reasonable and do not violate any statutory or constitutional provisions. ... Summary judgment statutes do impose a responsibility to defend such absolute (their inclusion of the word reasonable) declarations of innocence with more than a "scintilla" of proof. The obligation was to prove every constitutional claim made by plaintiff "unworthy" of a complete hearing. As most claims were not even referenced as individual constitutional issues, the obligation was not satisfied on this record. Defendant's July 26, 2002 motion for summary judgment [I] provides no relevant additional evidence or argument demonstrating that the constitutional issues raised in plaintiff's claims are negated by relevant settled law, or, for any other reason, are deserving of summary rejection. All citations to law and legal precedent involved cases of substantially different circumstances and claims and make no relevant contribution as a valid argument. From Brill (A-123-94): ... the court must accept as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and must accord him [or her] the benefit of all legitimate inferences which can be deduced therefrom, and if reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied. ... Based on the gross deficiencies of defendant's argument, the mere fact of plaintiff's opposition to the motion for summary disposal should have in itself been adequate cause for rejection. The fact that the judge allowed the defendant (moving party) to effectively ignore without reply the substantive answer [J] provided by the plaintiff--and still prevail--makes a mockery of any notion of fair process. From Brill(A-123-94): ... The judge's function is not himself [or herself] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. ... Plaintiff would contend that the defendant provided no "evidence to weigh" as defense against the claims of unconstitutionality and therefore could not possibly prevail on a justly decided summary motion. The issues were, in fact, not "ripe" for final decision, and the judge blatantly overstepped his bounds in making a final "determination of truth." Plaintiff would further claim that when a question of constitutionality is a material fact in dispute, arbitrary, malicious, or just reckless summary disposal becomes the higher crime of treasonous (anti-constitutional) obstruction of justice. Prejudgment, Deception, and Bigoted Intemperance: I reaffirm my contention [1T] that the lower court was guilty of obvious and egregious disqualifying misconduct. Unfortunately, I have no logical alternative but to conclude and claim that this appeals court has been complicit in this misconduct, as my well-reasoned appeal [F] to prevent this "judicial train wreck" of a trial from completing its wasteful and predictable journey into a pointless brick wall of reversible error was ignored without comment [G] by this court. For the record, I will state that "I told you so," and hope that a higher authority will hold someone to account for these layers of irresponsible dereliction. I refer you to the previously ignored appeal brief [F] and add the following clearly predictable examples of further misconduct by Judge Kuskin. During the brief oral arguments [2T] that preceded the judge's decision, the judge asked counsel for the Division of Taxation this one question: "What's the time period for imposing this tax?" The defendant's answer: "Your Honor, I'm not aware that there's any limit in which the Division has to operate in terms of a time limit on imposing it." [2T7-24] Considering the fact that the judge could have received no more preposterous (damaging to the defendant) an answer to this question, and that he chose not to address the issue of Division procedures at all in his decision,[2T12-15] it seems fair to ask: Why did he ask this question? And, more importantly, why didn't he follow it up with the question, "How can you defend your procedures as protective of civil Constitutional rights if you have no procedures?" It would be my contention that the question was not asked as a sincere inquiry, and that it was offered for the sake of appearance only. From the judge's summary judgment decision [2T33-3]: ... Mr. Mosher on page 9 of his brief raises a variety of rhetorical questions. I do not believe that they require any additional comment by me beyond what I have already set forth. Based on the analysis that I have placed on the record, the defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted. ... As there are no "rhetorical" questions on page 9 of my brief [J-9], this is but another grotesque, malicious, and wholly unjustifiable mischaracterization of my claims and evidence by Judge Kuskin. When one considers the fact that the only question the judge asked of the defendant relates to the issues raised on this page of my brief, this back-of-the-hand dismissal of questions that need answering before final argument can even be composed, represents nothing short of outrageously inappropriate conduct. On page 3 of my Brief in Answer to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, I begin my argument with the subject of jurisdiction and point out contradictory statements made by the judge regarding his jurisdiction. Later in Section 3d [J-7] I state: ... The Catch-22 imbecility of effectively being obligated to successfully prosecute federal Constitutional lawsuits before I can come to this court with claims of State violation of Constitutional law is an inverted perversion of the appropriate placement of the Burden of proof. ... This statement reveals the substantial doubt in my mind that my claims of constitutional violation were going to get a fair fight (a coalescing and refining debate) in referee Kuskin's court. I would argue that the judge was guilty of disqualifying Catch-23 imbecility in waiting until his final decision (after argument had been closed) to make the following explicit clarification and apology [2T17-3]: ... I made a statement that I did not have jurisdiction over federal constitutional questions. Assuming I made that statement, I misspoke. I apologize to Mr. Mosher and Miss Goldschmidt. I do have jurisdiction over those questions, and I will address them over the course of my opinion today. ... Misspoke?... "Misstatements" regarding facts of such material magnitude if perpetrated by litigants are doubtfully ever "forgiven" in the cases over which you preside. This dog-ate-my-homework silly explanation provides little cover behind which to hide from an accusation that the true purpose of the "off-the-record conversation"[D] was to insult, intimidate, and to mislead me into believing that he was right to imply that the only relevant issue was whether I bought cigarettes. Regardless of intent, this is a preposterous conception of due process. Threat Bargaining: Background Information: My research indicates that the State of New Jersey has twice in the past decade established a tax amnesty program that imposed a 5% penalty for non-participation. The key facts are that individuals owing state tax could avoid paying interest and penalties by accepting the terms of the amnesty program, which require the "tax ower" to sign away any future legal interests regarding any disputed issues. This law also applied to people currently in court who had already paid an un-refundable filing fee. References: A. From my first contact with Judge Kuskin [off-the-record conference][D]: ... Judge Kuskin: "Mr. Mosher the purpose of this phone call was not to deal with the merits of the case, but ... I simply want to inquire as to whether there ...there is this tax amnesty program in effect now that expires June 10th... and I don't know whether you're interested in disposing of the matter under that program or not. Umm... if you're not fine, and if you are, I just wanted to call it to your attention...The other thing is that the amnesty law provides that if your case qualifies for amnesty and you don't take advantage of it, there's an additional 5% penalty. ... My reply: "Well I think that's probably unconstitutional too, but that's fine". B. From my motion to disqualify the Judge [1T11-11]: ... Adding injury to this insult, the whole concept of this "off the record" give up now or we will persecute/punish you some more pre-trial "threat call", makes a mockery of this state's judicial branch of government. The fact that officers of the court who have been sworn to uphold and defend the Constitution can believe it to be constitutionally permissible to put a citizen at risk of added penalties for exercising their right to "redress of grievances" (after they have already paid for it) is worse than just evidence of ludicrous imbecility, it is added proof that our legal system is, in fact, catastrophically broken. ... ... Currently I face the risk of a 5% penalty for attempting to pursue my constitutional right of redress and justice. But what's to stop the Legislature from making it 7% or 70 or 7000% what's to stop the Legislature from deciding that a hearing before a Judge should cost $500,000 and the risk of the death penalty? If they can legally do one they can legally do the other --The fact is the judicial branch of Government has abdicated its oversight responsibility and now the only thing that stands between a reckless Legislature and a individual citizens' rights is the hope of popular majority intolerance. ... C. From my Superior Court motion for "leave to appeal" [F3] ... In conclusion I would like to reference the whole concept of judges making "give up now or face a 5% penalty" --threat bargaining-- "courtesy" calls. If the high courts of this state have not yet been compelled to render an opinion regarding the constitutionality of "threat bargaining" as an element of judicial process-- then, if it is within my right to do so, I would like to compel this court to fulfill its obligation to defend the integrity of constitutional principle and explain how "threat bargaining" can be validated as a constitutionally permissible element of "due process" and redress. ... D. From my answer to defendants' motion for summary judgment: [J7] ... It should not be my responsibility to prove to this judge that he violated fundamental Constitutional law when he threatened me with added monetary damages if I did not hastily retreat from his court and from my pursuit of "redress of grievances" (also included the added obligation to leave behind the filing fee I already paid and any future legal rights regarding the disputed issues). ... E From "Rules Governing Civil Practice" page 1598: ... As made clear by the 1983 report of the Civil Practice Committee there is still substantial concern and hesitation in generally allowing counsel fees as a sanction for so-called frivolous matters. Most significantly such a practice is regarded as having a potentially chilling effect on the assertion of meritorious claims and defenses. It is also believed that such a provision would add greatly to the volume of litigation since a party potentially subject to such an award would clearly have a right to attempt to demonstrate at an evidential hearing that while the claim or defense was unsuccessful it was nevertheless not frivolous and was asserted in good-faith. In short it was the committee's conclusion that there are grave problems in a broad rule which would necessarily invoke the risk of restoration of the pre-1948 system of inequities and iniquities which characterized counsel fee awards..... the committee was thus of the view that to whatever extent calendar control considerations require solicitude they should be dealt with directly and not by imposing burdens which advantage a particular economic class of litigants.... Argument: The difference between a constitutionally acceptable "plea-bargain" and a constitutionally unacceptable "threat-bargain" is the difference between using a "carrot" to seduce action and a "whip" to force action. The easiest way to test the constitutionality of a law is to construct the extreme circumstance that the law might permit. The Constitution is about principles and when tested as a principle "threat bargaining" has no defense. Imagine the circumstance of a presumed innocent person standing before a court and being instructed that if they do not now confess to the crime accused--if they are later found guilty--the court will burn down their mother's house or impose whatever other added penalty the power-drunk Governor and legislature pulls out of their hat of inquisitioners' tricks. How can anyone who recognizes the name Thomas Jefferson see justice in this extortion. A bizarre irony is revealed in the above reference "E", where the "committee" sees "grave problems" in imposing actual financial accountability for frivolous litigation, yet no State legal authority can see any problem in imposing a 5% penalty on all "Tax Court losers" whether their claims were made in good faith or not. In one word this is simply preposterous. An added issue, is the concept of a "percentage" penalty. Past opinions of the high courts of this country are literally littered with references to the evil of arbitrary discrimination. Using a "percentage" penalty implies the silly rationale that somehow the monetary amount in dispute has something to do with what level of penalty a claimant could afford to risk or that money is somehow related to legitimacy or character of claims made. Ignored in this stupid equation is the fact that some people come to court not for the money, but to seek justification and accountability, and that shouldn't cost one person substantially more money to acquire simply because the amount of money at issue in the case is substantially more. A depressing truth is that this horrible legislation has no doubt been glanced at, or touched by, dozens of state lawyers and yet none could see the obvious constitutional problem. I guess the only thing they teach in law school is how to count money. Claims of: Deficient or Misapplication of Constitutional law Unconstitutionality OF: "Cruel and Unusual" or "Excessive" Taxation: Beyond the abundant procedural and temperament breaches of required conduct, the legal reasoning applied in Judge Kuskin's decision is substantially flawed, and justice does require that it not be sustained or endorsed as an acceptable standard in the application of Constitutional law. In his decision,[2T24-12] Judge Kuskin declared: ...Therefore, I conclude that the Cigarette Tax Act is constitutional, not only under the general standards I've set forth, but also under the specific ruling with respect to the act as set forth in Lane Distributors verses Tilton. ... Viewed in the context of current circumstances where cigarette consumers are, in fact, not buying cigarettes but are, in fact, buying taxes with some cigarettes attached, reliance on 50-year-old law, established at a time when cigarettes were taxed at less than 10% of their production cost, stretches credibility. In my claim of Constitutional violation, I repeatedly reference the tax as extreme and "excessive". From Plaintiffs original Facts and Contentions [B3]: ... Fact: Excessively taxing minority vices in an "all-or-nothing" form of "democracy," where an un-geographically-segregated minority's political disenfranchisement is assured, amounts to taxation without representation. ... From my Brief in Answer to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment:[J] Page 4 Paragraph 2: ... I claim that it is the responsibility of the Judiciary, including this court, to prevent the Legislature or Governor from converting the social necessity of establishing and collecting government revenues into a weapon of reckless destruction or malicious tyranny. ... Page 4 Paragraph 5: ... The fact that Jefferson did not include in the Constitution a prohibition against "cruel and unusual taxation" would indicate that he saw no imminent danger of the right to tax being converted into a right to exploit and effectively prohibit. ... Page 5 Paragraph 2: ... I would contend that even by today's established "judicial perspective," consistent logic and justice requires any honest trier of fact to conclude that cigarettes have been taxed to unConstitutional excess. ... Page 5 Paragraph 3: ... It is self-evident fact that the state's primary interest in "cigarette taxes" was and is the money and the political advantage of finding and abusing a geographically fragmented, unorganized, politically powerless, popularly disliked minority to disproportionately soak for the cost of bloated self-serving government and its special interest moneyed owners. ... Page 5 Paragraph 6: ... Obviously missing is any reference to the "poor vulnerable children" in whose name these tax Acts were allowed to grow into practical (effective) prohibition. ... Page 5 Paragraph 7: ... Money has obscured real debate, and in violation of its responsibility, the Judiciary has not obligated the state to defend the politically expedient "pickpocket" approach of extreme prohibitive minority taxation as a "reasonable remedy" in the light of the abundant better (more effective, less Constitutionally destructive) alternatives. ... My argument was not, and is not, that no tax can be assessed on cigarettes. The argument is that the tax can't be "excessive" or imposed outside the reasonable boundaries of a reasonable scheme of "equitable distribution" of the tax burden. Limited tax code exemption from 14th Amendment obligations is intended as a concession to the impossibility of "perfect equality" and provides no cover to defend the deliberate inequity and politically expedient discrimination that I claim has perverted the cigarette tax into an unconstitutional tyranny. I believe if I had been provided the opportunity to present my "proofs," I could produce evidence demonstrating that the actual legislative purpose of recent (last 10 years) increases in cigarette taxes was not to reasonably provide for "equitable distribution of the tax burden" but was, in fact, intended to do exactly the opposite in clear violation of the 14th Amendment. The clear precedent of the court in cases involving a claim of unfair taxation is that "tax policy" is not immune to 14th Amendment challenge, and there is certainly no precedent establishing any court's right to summarily ignore (leave unaddressed) a citizen's claim of violation. In Judge Kuskin's "decision" [2T12-16] which was, in effect, a defense of defendant's vacant argument, the issue of "excessive taxation" was given no consideration, and my legitimate claim of "unconstitutionally excessive taxation" was not addressed. Had my claims and myself been afforded the complete fair trial to which they were constitutionally entitled, I would have likely defended my claims (depending on: scope, documentation secured, and witness testimony) with these elements of argument (offered as examples of what could be "inferred" from my claimed facts): Extreme and unusual taxation constitutes an attack on liberty itself and deserves testing by the strictest scrutiny. When a tax becomes an extreme imposition compromising the equal liberty of a substantially large economic class, the 14th Amendment does require that the nature of the discrimination be shown to be unavoidable and without alternative. The whole concept of taxing a legally addictive substance has an unethical taint that obligates legislative intent to be clear, unambiguous, and invulnerable to even the appearance of maliciously discriminatory intent. To be seen for what it is, the "taxation of cigarettes" must be seen in complete context. Like a cruel and unusual punishment, excessive and unusual taxation can be obscured behind the screen of many smaller trespasses. Imagine a criminal punishment that allowed thousands of people to individually give a convict a single poke with a stick. No single action by any one individual involved would likely be seen as a constitutional violation-- yet the collective impact could not reasonably be seen as anything else. All individual penalties/taxes against cigarette smokers must be seen in this context, and if a court is going to allow "stick poking" (taxation) it has a responsibility to provide a mechanism to prevent the collective impact of unconstitutional excess. Sales Tax Non-Exemption: From: Sixth "Facts and Contentions" [B3]: ... Fact: Adding sales tax liability to this one class of internet purchases adds insult to the constitutional injury. ... From: My answer in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.[J4-3] . .. From the cigarette tax (taxation of a minority vice) itself, through reliance on the Jenkins Act, and a preposterous sales tax un-exclusion, to the endgame of enforcement where rights of privacy, honesty and fair notice have no meaning, the State's objective has been to push Constitutional boundaries and exploit superficial literal weaknesses in 200 year-old words. ... [J8]... 3d-4: Regarding the sales tax: My claim that the State is dishonestly (and therefore illegally) using the mask of a broad sales tax to do nothing more than establish another cigarette tax has not been sufficiently addressed by the State. On page 10 of the motion brief for summary judgment, Defendant does provide citation regarding part of what the Sales and Use Tax Act provides. Absent is a complete listing of what has been exempted and any evidence mitigating a claim that the exemptions are, in fact, merely convenient indulgences to politically powerful special and majority interests and constitute a violation of due process and equal protection. In other words, a Constitutionally legitimate, fair, broad, and inclusive tax act has been perverted, through political interest exemption, into a tyrannically narrow, minority punitive, and patently unfair (especially to the impoverished) Minority Vice Abuse Act... The fact that sales tax legislation has been modified by special-interest engineering is indisputable. It is also a fact that cigarettes have the unique distinction of being taxed at a percentage rate many hundreds of times their value--creating the somewhat ludicrous circumstance of a sales tax levy that is in most part a tax on taxes. Therefore, absent compelling legal case precedent, a claim of due process and equal protection violations is not a summarily dismissible or unreasonable legal theory. As there can be no complete argument of this claim without documentation regarding what has been exempted, or more importantly "unexempted", and without complete documentation of the legislative history (intent), I will not attempt further argument regarding the claim itself. What I will argue, is that the legal theory deserves a fair trial and that Judge Kuskin stepped way beyond permissible boundaries in offering this legally vacant, two-sentence puddle of absolute nonsense as defense of summary disposal.[2T27-3] ... There is no doubt about the constitutionality of the sales and use Tax Act. The failures that Mr. Mosher cites have no bearing upon the validity of that act or upon the tax liability which is the subject of this appeal. ... If this court chooses to uphold this as a permissible standard for summary disposal you might as well put a "Gone Fishing" (or Golfing) sign on every courthouse door in New Jersey. "Seizure" of Purchase Information: From: My answer in opposition to the motion for summary judgment [J8]. ... 3d-3: My claim that the "Jenkins Act," as used by the the New Jersey Division of Taxation (without requiring fair disclosure to the purchaser) constitutes a Constitutionally illegal seizure of Constitutionally protected private property (reasonably presumed private purchase information) has not been, with relevant evidence, refuted by the Division of Taxation . On page 12 Defendant does reference case law. However, the referenced cases claimed violations of due process and did not claim violations of Constitutionally protected privacy and are, therefore, of no relevant meaning in this case. The fact that this 50-year-old Act remains substantially untested and untried Constitutionally is more evidence of the destructive impact of judicial barriers to fair access and redress and proves absolutely nothing regarding this law's actual Constitutional credibility. I would further claim that State law (legal precedent in entrapment cases) requires State agencies that use outside "agents" (the Jenkins Act) to secure evidence to be equipped to substantially defend the credibility of those agents. I would simply argue that the New Jersey Division of Taxation cannot credibly defend or vouch for the credibility of an "agent law" that has not yet passed a relevant Constitutional test. ... This statement concisely and clearly states my claims regarding the unconstitutionality of the Jenkins Act itself, and the unconstitutionality of the state's use of this law as an "agent". I cannot likely compose a better definition of my claims and therefore restate it in this argument. Nothing in Judge Kuskin's decision coherently, or with relevance, references my claims. There is no reference to the circumstance of the "seizure" of my private purchase information, or any explanation of the compelling social "state" interest in that seizure being covertly perpetrated without notice or consent. I have repeatedly referenced the concept of "entrapment," and my claim that the state is acting as an unconstitutionally complicit partner in what amounts to a mail-order racket was not addressed. Furthermore, in my claims I made no reference to any concern over the issue of public disclosure of the stolen information. My concern is with the unconsentual seizure of the information, and for the record, I find it offensive to have case law involving the disclosure rights of convicted child molesters used [2T29-8] to dismiss my civil right of privacy and my right not to have control over my property (presumed private purchase information) seized through unwarranted covert duplicity and deception. State Tax Collection Procedures: From plaintiff's Request for Leave To Appeal[F] ... 3. Instead of explaining (in his decision of June 21st) how "a lot of allegations" is a fair characterization of my complaint, Judge Kuskin compounded his offense against my right to impartial judgment with this less than accurate and less than fair "raft" of rhetoric: "I have reviewed that complaint again in connection with today's motion, and my review reveals what Mr. Mosher acknowledged in his argument, that is, that the complaint does not deny the purchase of the cigarettes, it raises a raft of other issues, some constitutional, some appearing to be based on fairness or other similar grounds." Glaringly absent is any reference to the fact that in my complaint I make direct accusations regarding misconduct by the Division of Taxation. The only logical assumption available is that Judge Kuskin sees that "Central Issue" as just some lesser stick that makes up the raft of other junk he plans to ignore. ... From the judges decision granting summary termination.[2T33-3] ...Mr. Mosher, on page 9 of his brief, raises a variety of rhetorical questions I do not believe that they require any additional comment by me beyond what I have already set forth based on the analysis that I have placed on the record. The defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted.... These excerpts reveal a glaring example of shameful judicial process. In spite of the fact that I filed a Superior Court motion directly seeking the relief of having this issue of Tax Division misconduct addressed by the court, Judge Kuskin, in arrogant, overt defiance of his obligations once again chose to instead malign, mischaracterize, and leave my claims totally unaddressed. I once again reiterate there are no "rhetorical questions" in the 3d-5: Section (page 9) of my brief and even if they could rationally be interpreted as statements rather than questions, the statements still deserved addressing. A significant impetus for me taking this case to court in the first place was the substantial anger I felt at being berated by a "public servant" (Tax Division employee) with the outrageous rhetoric "we can wait 10 years to send out a tax notice if we felt like it". I came to court essentially seeking accountability for that statement. Is this the best an honest, decent citizen can expect from its government? Apparently in Judge Kuskin's America a citizen deserves no better-- I say apparently because he doesn't have the integrity to say it explicitly, instead choosing the implicit endorsement of complete retreat. So now the ball is in your court. Will you play it or will you pass, and force me to embarrass the New Jersey Judiciary by having a federal court explain to you that there is no room under constitutional law, or common law, for arbitrary, negligent, lazy 10 year, or 16 month, or even 8 month indefensible government delays in the processing of simple form letter tax notices. It is indisputable fact that the delay substantially increased my liability. In the first place, I wouldn't have been purchasing cigarettes for neighbors, and in the second place, I wouldn't have incurred the extra cost of shipping and a higher pre-tax price. I also contend that there is a direct relationship between how much I must pay for cigarettes and how much I smoke over a given period of time. Had I been informed of the actual cost of the cigarettes I was smoking, I contend I would have smoked less and in turn been obligated to pay less tyrannical state usury for that "privilege". RELIEF SOUGHT: At minimum what I seek from this court is the complete argument and the fair decision I and my issues were denied in Judge Kuskin's court. If I believed that justice was denied by reason of an honest misunderstanding, or good-faith error, I could and would ask for nothing more from this court. However, as I believe the evidence shows beyond all reasonable doubt that justice in this case was not merely misplaced, but was in fact stolen, I don't think that crime should go unpunished. While I would not oppose personal sanctions against the judge and the Attorney General's office (violating their oath by aggressively defending bad legislation over constitutional principle) such a remedy would not restore the time, work, and money I have lost to this unjust process. I think a more appropriate sanction would be to expedite, and make certain of, the Justice they sought to deny. Give me the courtesy of facing future process without the impediment of further financial liability, assign the case the professional counsel the issues deserve, and let the battle be fought in a venue appropriate to a clear resolution (perhaps this court or remand the issues directly to the Supreme Court). Conclusion: For the foregoing reasons the Tax Court decision granting defendants' motion for summary termination of proceedings should be reversed applying all due prejudice and all due compensation for justice denied. Respectfully submitted, __________________________ Gary Mosher