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Included documents:
The facts and contentions I filed as my complaint against the Division of Taxation. Marked AC#1
Transcript of May 31, 2002 "off the record" telephone conference I had tape-recorded. Marked AC#2
Relevant excerpts from transcript of the of June 21st motion hearing and judge's decision not to recuse himself. Marked AC#3
Copy of "order denying motion" I received June 27th
Relevant legal citations:
I frankly cannot within the provided time restraints do any substantial legal research regarding precedent. But if I am required to site law (statutes or precedent) I provide these two legal references from the judge's decision.
1:12-1. Cause for Disqualification; On the Court's Motion.
The judge of any court shall be disqualified on the court's own motion and shall not sit in any matter, if the judge...
(f) when there is any other reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so.
In State vs. Marshall a decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court reported at 148 New Jersey at page 89 decided by the Court in 1997 the Court stated at pages 275 and 276,
....Of course an error might be sufficiently blatant and so lacking in an alternative good-faith explanation that the error would support a charge of bias.
My argument requesting appellate relief:
In his oral decision of June 21st judge Kuskin does not in my opinion provide the required alternative reasonable (good-faith) explanation for the remarks made to me during the May 31, 2002 conference call. Nothing stated in his decision in any way erodes the reasonableness of my perception that he did pre-judge and maliciously maligne (miss-characterize) my complaint and is not qualified by understanding or temperament to fairly investigate, deliberate, or judge the facts and issues of my case against the Division of Taxation. I would further argue that in his oral decision of June 21st he provides further evidence of disqualifying belief and temperament. For example:
1. I made some serious and direct accusations in my statement (exhibit ac#3 pg.2) in defense of my motion for recuseal. The fact that judge Kuskin heard nothing in my statement that would inspire a need or desire to give the issues some deliberation or even reference, raises a reasonable doubt regarding his ability to apply any real fair intellectual judgment to any of the relevant circumstances in this case.
2. In spite of being essentially forewarned ( in my original complaint I project substantial cynicism regarding my opinion of the judicial system.) that I would be looking for evidence of unfairness and bias, judge Kuskin with a reckless ease only afforded the very arrogant displays (in his decision of June 21st) a complete insensitivity to the circumstance of my poverty--showing his temperament to be blighted by an unacceptable "class bias."
Doing Judge Kuskin the reciprocal "courtesy" of explaining the obvious--I will point out that it is a fact of the human condition on earth that people must purchase their survival and comfort from a vastly different volume of resources. This fact has as its purist intellectual consequence the understanding in the enlightened mind that value is in fact relative and that it cannot be assumed common to all persons. I think it is a fair question to ponder-- If I were a millionaire with a "relativity" irrelevant $10,000 complaint would judge Kuskin have characterized my complaint with trivializing rhetoric like:
"Since the amount of tax sought was relatively small, I thought that might be a something that Mr. Mosher should consider." or "I continue to believe that it was appropriate for Mr. Mosher to consider amnesty given the amount of the tax liability which was imposed upon him" ?
I would contend that an amount approaching 10% of my income can not be described as "relatively small" by any one relatively enlightened enough to sit in judgment.
3. Instead of explaining (in his decision of June 21st) how "a lot of allegations" is a fair characterization of my complaint judge Kuskin compound his offense against my right to impartial judgment with this less than accurate and less than fair "raft" of rhetoric:
"I have reviewed that complaint again in connection with today's motion and my review reveals what Mr. Mosher acknowledged in his argument, that is, that the complaint does not deny the purchase of the cigarettes, it raises a raft of other issues, some constitutional, some appearing to be based on fairness or other similar grounds."
Glaringly absent is any reference to the fact that in my complaint I make direct accusations regarding misconduct by the Division of Taxation. The only logical assumption available is that judge Kuskin sees that "Central Issue" as just some lesser stick that makes up the raft of other junk he plans to ignore.
In conclusion I would like to reference the whole concept of judges making "give up now or face a 5% penalty" --threat bargaining-- "courtesy" calls. If the high courts of this state have not yet been compelled to render an opinion regarding the constitutionality of "threat bargaining" as an element of judicial process-- then, if it is within my right to do so, I would like to compel this court to fulfill its obligation to defend the integrity of constitutional principle and explain how "threat bargaining" can be validated as a constitutionally permissible element of "due process" and redress.
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